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A First Appraisal of Serrano 
John E. Coons, Wm. H. Clune, DI and 
Stephen D. Sugarman 
A host of legal and related issues have been posed 
by the recent decision in Serrano v. Priest;1 a selective 
scanning of these issues, in an attempt to ascertain 
their importance and likely impact, is now necessary. 
In Serrano the Supreme Court of California held that 
to the extent existing differences in spending among 
school districts are caused by differences in wealth,2 
the present scheme for financing public schools in 
California violates federal and state equal protection 
guarantees. The court further held that although 
school finance mechanisms may differ along many 
dimensions, they must respect one proscription: the 
quality of public education, at least as measured by 
spending per pupil, may not be a function of wealth 
other than the wealth of the state as a whole. 3 
Redundancy may be helpful here. One restatement 
of the court's holding is that Serrano requires of the 
state a fiscal neutrality among those agencies it creates 
and empowers to make different choices regarding 
educational spending. Another paraphrase would be 
that, to the extent the state allows quantities of public 
education to be bought by local units (whether 
counties, school districts, schools, or families), unit 
wealth must not be allowed to affect the quantity 
purchased. Since, as things stand, local taxable wealth 
per pupil is a major determinant of public school 
spending in almost all states, Serrano is significant; 
insofar as fiscal neutrality is not an elementary or 
unambiguous concept, the meaning of Serrano remains 
obscure. Speculation about its career is worthwhile 
if risky. 
There are already signs of the decision's legal 
vitality in addition to the untutored (and undeserved) 
hosannas of property tax vigilantes and political 
opportunists. The holding has been approved and 
applied to the Minnesota financing system in a declar-
atory judgment by the Federal District Court in 
Van Dusartz v. Hatfield,4 and to the Texas financing 
system in Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent 
School District. 5 Many similar suits are progressing 
toward judgment in other states brought by lawyers 
acting in apparent accord on the fundamental ques-
tion. Anticipatory responses are stirring in other 
branches of government at all levels. Given the present 
quantum of activity one might conclude that a series 
of major decision-points may be at hand regarding the 
forty-five billion dollars collected and disbursed for 
elementary and secondary education in the United 
States. 
Radiations of Serrano are likely to touch increas-
ingly wider rings of power and interest, each likely 
to be affected and to respond particularistically. Three 
of these rings will be briefly considered here. The 
narrowest focus is the judicial arena: what will happen 
to Serrano and similar cases (e.g., will they be re-
versed?) and what is their significance to the body of 
Constitutional law? Next, Serrano holdings imply fairly 
prompt legislative action; how will state legislatures 
and the federal government respond (e.g., by a cen-
tralized or decentralized system)? Finally, there is 
the longer-run impact upon and reaction of the 
political community as a whole: what major changes 
are predictable over time given this major thrust 
toward redistribution of public resources? 
The First Ring: 
Serrano, The Courts, and Constitutional Law 
The Posture of the Present Litigation 
A variety of procedural and jurisdictional questions 
leave the eventual fate of the Serrano case itself in 
nubibus and will affect the rate of its progress through 
the system. It seems likely that the case which first 
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reaches the United States Supreme Court will arise 
in another state and through the federal courts. 
There are two federal doctrines which are relevant 
here. The first is the "final judgment" rule which 
probably insulates Serrano itself from im'mediate 
review by the federal high court. 6 That is, certiorari 
should properly be denied since the case arose and 
was decided on the pleadings and presumably will go 
to trial at an early date. The California Supreme Court 
itself has declared the decision not to be a "final 
judgment."7 Only when the trial and the available 
state appeals have been completed will the case be 
ripe for review on certiorari. Of course, review could 
occur at the present stage if for example, the United 
States Supreme Court concludes that the trial is but a 
formality. 8 The Serrano opinion may be read to 
foreclose every factual issue except the allegations 
concerning tax rates, spending, and district taxable 
wealth which are matters of public record and ap-
parently undisputed. 9 So viewed the factual result is 
foregone. Nevertheless, the state proceeding will 
involve the substantial and delicate question of the 
appropriate order; thusfar no one has been ordered to 
act or refrain from acting in any way. It is unlikely 
at this stage that the U.S. Supreme Court would reach 
for the case. 
The longer range question is whether Serrano is 
vulnerable at all in view of the possible presence of 
an "adequate and independent state ground."10 The 
opinion cites the state constitutional counterparts to 
equal protection as supporting the result and then 
adds artfully that the California law is "substantially 
the equivalent" of federal equal protection.11 This 
represents another step in a continuing pas de deux 
between the California and United States Supreme 
Court.12 The California court could have either 
insulated the decision from review by stressing the 
independence of state law 1 3 or harmonized its judg-
ment with an emergent federal rule by striking "sub-
stantially. "14 What it has done instead is to leave the 
federal courts free to move to the merits on the federal 
question while leaving itself free to preserve the 
result in California even if a Serrano-type case goes 
down to defeat by the Burger court. 
In all probability Serrano itself will never be decided 
on the merits by the U.S. Supreme Court. Some of 
the cases now in process in federal courts may face 
their own problems of delay and restraint under the 
abstention doctrine, 15 but it is most likely that one 
or more of them will reach the high court in the next 
eighteen months, well ahead of the probable Serrano 
timetable. 16 
It is also possible that the Serrano rule could be 
seriously affected or even subsumed by the decision 
of a case or cases which barely resemble the school 
finance litigation. One candidate is Johnson v. New 
York State Education Department, 17 decided by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 
The complaint asserts that fees for textbooks are 
unconstitutional, because education is a fundamental 
interest and fees are an invidious discrimination on 
the basis of personal wealth. The court split 2-1, 
holding against plaintiff children. Should the Supreme 
Court review the substantive issue and decide it 
against plaintiffs, it may be hard sledding for Serrano-
type actions, although there is an important distinction 
available in the purely def acto character of the 
wealth classification in Johnson .1 s Contrariwise a 
substantive victory in Johnson would be most 
helpful.19 
The Holding and its Rationale 
Whatever the procedural odysseys of the current 
litigation, in the long run the substance of the problem 
and its solutions will determine the final outcome. 
Serrano begins with a complaint about the manner in 
which public schools are financed in California.20 
This financing system, shared in its essence by almost 
all other states, relies upon three sources of money: 
local school district taxes (on property), state aid, and 
miscellaneous revenues from the federal government. 
Federal aid tends to be directed toward specific edu-
cational purposes (e.g., disadvantaged children, 
school lunches) and constitutes only a small fraction 
of total spending for public schools. State aid is dis-
tributed in two principal ways: first, under the 
"Foundation Plan" the state sets some level of 
educational spending (say $500 per pupil) which the 
state will support on a fully equalized basis. "Fully 
equalized" means that any incapacity of a district to 
raise that amount of money is compensated for by the 
state. For every district there is calculated the amount 
of money that would be raised by a levy on its property 
of some rate (e.g., 1 % ); to the extent that the amount 
raised from this 1 % would fall short of the foundation 
level, state aid makes up the difference. Thus, the 
poorer the district, the more the state supplies in 
foundation aid. Second, the state dispenses "flat" 
grants; this is a uniform amount-$125 per pupil in 
California-which is guaranteed to all districts if they 
do not receive this much in foundation aid; in short, 
it is money for the relatively rich districts. 21 Overall, 
however, these state and federal subventions somewhat 
prefer the poorer districts. 
Finally, there is the local tax levy. This last category 
of public school revenues, because it is so sensitive 
to the wealth of local districts, is the real source of 
the Serrano complaint. In 1968-69, the foundation 
plan in California equalized districts up to $355 and 
$488 spending per pupil respectively for elementary 
and high schools; yet the average respective spending 
per pupil in the state during 1968-69 was $611 and 
$836. This substantial difference between equalized 
support and actual spending is supplied mainly by 
local revenues, and each dollar of local revenue per 
child comes at a different tax price for every district 
in relation to the wealth of that district. Because for 
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the poor district each dollar above the foundation 
represents a much greater tax sacrifice (rate) than for 
the richer one, spending per pupil is highly correlated 
with, and obviously influenced by, local resources. 
If every district sacrificed equally for education, 
levying the same educational rate on its assessed 
valuation, Beverly Hills, at $87 ,000 assessed valuation 
per elementary pupil, would raise over ten times as 
much local revenue as West Covina, at less than 
$8,000. While Beverly Hills is too wealthy even to 
be able to spend all it would raise at a tax rate equal to 
the statewide average rate for schools, West Covina 
is too poor to run a school at that same rate. In 
1968-69, with all aid included, Beverly Hills spent 
$1,232 per pupil at a local tax rate of about 22 mills; 
West Covina, at a rate of over 44 mills, was able to 
spend only $621 per pupil-half the spending for 
twice the tax rate. The example is not an extreme case. 
Analysis of the entire distribution of districts reveals 
a consistent pattern. 22 
This nexus of wealth and spending is the target of 
the Serrano and Van Dusartz holdings. The rationale 
adopted by the two courts to void that nexus invokes 
the converging persuasions of the "fundamental 
interest" and "suspect classification" test---classifi-
cation by wealth of school districts is constitutionally 
suspect when it affects the enjoyment of a fundamental 
interest, which the court in each case held education 
to be. To justify its injury to plaintiff pupils caused 
by a wealth discrimination structure, the state must 
show a compelling interest the advancement of which 
requires such a system. It showed none in either of 
the cases. 
A few words about these tools of equal protection 
analysis developed by the Warren court23 are neces-
sary but risky. The fundamental interest label ob-
viously confers a special constitutional status. 
However, in itself it suggests no specific prohibitions 
or prescriptions of state action. For example, to 
declare an interest fundamental is not necessarily to 
prescribe an equality of its dispensation. The right 
to travel may be fundamental without its forbidding 
cheaper bus tokens for persons over 65. The presence 
of fundamentality by itself decides no cases. It merely 
triggers an expansion of the court's ordinary view 
of what is relevant and of its ordinary standard for 
determining the validity of state action. 
The Court's standard, in most equal protection 
cases, is mere legislative rationality; in fundamental 
interest cases it is no stretch to define the standard 
as super-rationality-the state action must appear to 
the Court not merely as sane but as plausible policy. 
In the voting cases, for example, the United States 
Supreme Court has spoken of "the exacting standard 
of precision we require" of the state in its selection 
of persons appropriate to exercise the franchise.24 
Thus, the fixing of a very limited cadre of privileged 
interests permits the Court to employ a more exacting 
rationality standard without eroding the more tolerant 
standard for the general run of cases. 
The notion of the "suspect classification" is no less 
difficult to summarize. On its face it would seem to 
be a counsel of neutrality which threatens any em-
ployment of a particular category. However, if wealth 
is universally suspect as a classification, what are we 
to make of the horde of enactments specifically bene-
fitting the poor? Is the idea of the "suspect classi-
fication" test not neutrality at all but rather its 
opposite-partiality to the poor? Perhaps, but if so, 
why does Serrano specifically declare personal poverty 
to be unnecessary to the outcome, relying instead on 
collective (school district) wealth alone? Is it, perhaps, 
because the real principle is, indeed, a super-
rationality or "good sense" test and that the use of 
rich and poor districts to carry out a uniform edu-
cational responsibility is simply stupid policy? The 
Serrano opinion invites this analysis with its ob-
servation that: 
... discrimination on the basis of district wealth is equally 
invalid. The commercial and industrial property which 
augments a district's tax base is distributed unevenly through-
out the state. To allot more educational dollars to the 
children of one district than to those of another merely 
because of the fortuitous presence of such property is to make 
the quality of a child's education dependent upon the location 
of private commercial and industrial establishments. Surely, 
this is to rely on the most irrelevant of factors as the basis for 
educational financing.25 
In any case this conjunction of "fundamental in-
terest" and "suspect classification" shifts the burden 
to the state, requiring it to demonstrate a state interest 
which is both compelling and which cannot be served 
by a system of finance less onerous to the plaintiffs. 
If, for example, the state had manifested a compelling 
interest in having local control over school spending, 
it would have been necessary to determine under 
what alternative structures, if any, such local control 
could be effective. Unfortunately for the state, the 
court found no such interest in local control manifested 
by a system which dispenses local privilege and 
burden so erratically that "fiscal freewill is a cruel 
illusion for the poor school districts. "26 Thus, it was 
unnecessary for the plaintiff-children to go further and 
demonstrate that local control and fiscal-neutrality 
are in fact compatible. 
The premises the court declares in Serrano (special 
interest, suspect classification, absence of advantage 
to state policy) do not imply or demand the court's 
conclusion (the rule of fiscal neutrality in education). 
However, they come as close to this as we are ac-
customed to expect in the law. In fact, if there is 
deductive error, some would assign it not to the court's 
boldness but to its failure to mandate statewide uni-
formity. 27 In that respect, however, the court deserves 
high marks precisely because it acted with restraint. 
If the offending classification in Serrano is wealth, the 
court's decision is properly tailored to eliminate that 
influence. That the principle enunciated be limited to 
attacking the particular evil it sets out to abolish is a 
sound canon of logical as well as judicial parsimony. 
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Four Interesting Problems for Serranoptimists 
Serrano and Van Dusartz have a strong appeal 
because of their factual soundness and moderate 
constitutional stance. If reversal ensues, the basic 
reason is likely to be a general condition of stasis in 
the Supreme Court; the novelty of these cases and their 
very importance are their primary strategic weak-
nesses. If the Court is intimidated by the high stakes 
involved, it may easily wash its hands in the warm 
waters of the rationality test. However, there are also 
a number of truly interesting sub-elements in the case 
that may be thought relevant and be given serious 
attention by judges and critics. Of these, four are 
relatively important and will be briefly considered 
here. They are: 
(l) the cost-quality relation; (2) the peculiar relation 
of fiscal-neutrality to the injury of the individual child; 
(3) the rationale for treating education as a funda-
mental interest and its relevance to the status of other 
governmental services; (4) the conundrums of ag-
gregate v. individual wealth. 
First, as to cost/quality, the plaintiff-children's 
injury because of discrimination in the system of 
school finance is presumably significant, but the fact 
is that no one can say how significant. Social science 
has much to say about the cost/ quality problem, but 
the net effect is agnosticism. 2 s The California court 
comes close to saying that it will assume the presence 
of a positive relation of money to quality in education 
in the absence of proof to the contrary.29 The 
Van Dusartz court says it plainly: 
... [T]he Legislature would seem to have foreclosed this 
issue to the State by establishing a system encouraging 
variation in spending; it would be high irony for the State 
to argue that large portions of the educational budget 
authorized by law in effect are thrown away ... .3° 
Whether the respective defendants nonetheless 
will try to put the matter in issue at the trial is anyone's 
guess. Presumably it is a factual question on which 
expert testimony will be significant. 
The second problem is the relation of the Serrano 
rule to the injury. We have said that the rule is neatly 
limited to the wrong, which is the use of wealth 
criteria for spending. This is so, but this niceness of 
the Serrano rule produces a remedy much less 
egalitarian than at first appears. Since local option for 
spending can remain the key determinant of the ab-
solute number of dollars per child spent on education 
under a Serrano-type rationale, in theory the plaintiff-
child could wind up worse off than he started. This 
could happen in a fiscally-neutral but de-centralized 
system in which his district (or family or metro-unit) 
chose to spend little on education.3 1 It thus is plain 
that Serrano is not concerned with level of spending 
for education as such. Rather it announces a limited 
right that, if governmental entities are empowered to 
decide about and administer children's education, 
they must be provided an equality of economic 
capacity to carry out that function. In the strictest 
sense we are dealing not with a right to education but 
with a political right about education. The child is 
assured only that those agencies which do decide about 
educational spending shall be created equal by the 
state. Whether this result is ultimately disappointing 
to the plaintiffs, however, depends in large measure 
upon the outcome of the large-scale legislative read-
justment which is required by Serrano and which may 
be the single most important effect of the decision. 
Third, it is useful to ask: why education and, con-
versely, why not other governmental services?32 The 
issue of why and whether education should be treated 
as fundamental is rendered acute by the recent 
decisions in Dandridge v. Williams3 3 and Jamesv. 
Valtierra, 34 which seem to reject the fundamentality 
of the welfare and housing interests for purposes of 
equal protection. While the California court suggests 
several relevant qualities of education which support 
its fundamentality and which are not shared by welfare 
and housing, 3 5 the matter is not simple. The deciding 
factor, clearly, is not the sheer importance of the 
interest; it seems as important to be alive (health 
services, welfare) as to be educated. The salient dif-
ference lies in education's relation to other consti-. 
tutional values-especially political and intellectual 
values. 
We must be satisfied here with a mere reference to 
this tangled question. Presumably counsel in the 
school finance cases will perceive and argue the right 
of the child to education both in terms of its crucial 
relation to the viability of our political system and 
its inseparability from the values of liberty of thought 
and speech. At its core Serarno represents both a 
political and intellectual right. It is these qualities 
which secure its fundamentality and which simul-
taneously distinguish it from the creature comforts-
or even necessities-represented in welfare and 
housing. 
Fourth, the distinction between collective and in-
dividual wealth is worth considering. Serrano forbids 
discrimination in education upon either basis, 3 6 but it 
is likely that the proof required at trial will be confined 
to the wealth of school districts. At present it is very 
difficult to specify the degree to which personal and 
school district wealth coincide. 31 The economists 
seem confident that the relation is positive, but the 
anomalies are frequent and sometimes embarrassing. 
Not only do poor people inhabit rich industrial en-
claves with low populations, but they also are found 
in large numbers in certain large cities, a few of which, 
for school purposes, are relatively well off (e.g., 
New York and San Francisco--a primary cause is 
significant private school enrollment). Equally 
troublesome, perhaps, the rich sometimes live in tax-
poor areas. Serrano, thus, is not a one-edged blade 
for the war on poverty. However, this relative neu-
trality among economic classes may provide unex-
pected political support from the nonpoor who live or 
own property in poor districts. It also reinforces the 
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view that the decision has as much to do with ration-
ality in government as with poverty. 
Economic neutrality may or may not impair 
the analogizing of Serrano to the earlier wealth-
discrimination cases. These decisions all dealt only 
with personal wealth, not with the wealth of govern-
mental units. This distinction is not necessarily 
harmful to Serrano. What the case lacks in terms of 
the highly visible personal impact of discrimination 
upon a plaintiff-child, it retrieves in terms of the mass 
effect of these absurd education financing systems 
upon the injured class of plaintiffs38 as a whole and 
thus upon society. Further, as the California and 
federal court both emphasize, the fact that the districts 
are creatures of the state eliminates the de facto 
debility from which all the previous decisions suffered: 
... we find the case unusual in the extent to which gov-
ernmental action is the cause of the wealth classifications. 
The school funding scheme is mandated in every detail by the 
California Constitution and statutes. Although private 
residential and commercial patterns may be partly responsible 
for the distribution of assessed valuatfon throughout the 
state, such patterns are shaped and hardened by zoning or-
dinances and other governmental land-use controls which 
promote economic exclusivity .... [citations] Governmental 
action drew the school district boundary lines, thus de-
termining how much local wealth each district would contain. 
... [citations] Compared with Griffin and Douglas, for 
example, official activity has played a significant role in 
establishing the economic classifications challenged in this 
action.39 
Finally, even if discrimination based upon personal 
poverty were taken as a necessary criterion of judicial 
intervention, it is present in the facts of the school 
finance cases in two respects. First, the present system 
bears hardest upon those inhabitants of poor school 
districts who are themselves poor and thereby pre-
cluded from exercising their right of exit to the private 
school. Further, it seems appropriate for the court 
to view the class "children" as simply a sub-group of 
the class "poor". Realistically all children are poor.40 
Statistically most are protected from their poverty 
by the private activity of their parents, but this should 
not insulate the state from responsibility for their 
education in the public sector. The problem here is 
similar to that recently scrutinized by the federal 
court in Chandler v. South Bend Community School 
Corp. 41 There public schools took punitive measures 
against children whose parents failed either to pay 
school fees or sign an "inability to pay" form: 
The school fee collection procedure as applied to these 
minor-Plaintiffs, conditions their personal right to an educa-
tion upon the vagaries of their parents' conduct, an intolerable 
practice ... '"(ital. in original). 
Such separation of the interest of child and parent 
could be enormously significant in future encounters 
among pupils, parents, and the state on issues ranging 
from compulsory education to school finance. 
The Second Ring: Likely and Acceptable 
Legislative Remedies 
The Serrano and Van Dusartz holdings allow for 
much legislative discretion as to the kind of system 
the state can constitutionally propose as a remedy in 
the litigation. Differences in spending per child are 
permitted, whether based on educational policy 
decisions by the state government (aid for the dis-
advantaged, gifted, handicapped) or by local govem-
ments. 43 Complete spending uniformity, or uniformity 
plus the categorical add-ons just mentioned, is also 
permissible. All that is forbidden is employment of 
units with similar tasks but differing capacity to 
spend.44 
Educational spending uniformity supported and 
supervised by the state government is not difficult to 
understand as a legislative remedy. Categorical aid 
(i.e., policy or "needs" aid) is similarly clear. The only 
elusive and somewhat controversial remedy is the one 
which allows spending levels for education to be 
fixed by the local political process. How can local 
spending options (unsupervised by the state as to 
motive and purpose) be retained under Serrano? The 
practical responses lie essentially in larger equalizing 
aid to districts and/ or smaller differences in their 
taxable wealth per pupil. Under present systems, 
meager doses of such equalizing state aid are 
used to implement an implicit legislative policy 
that spending may not be entirely a function of 
wealth. Aid for education is dispensed inversely to 
wealth and (occasionally) positively to tax effort. 
Under Serrano these subventions to the poor districts 
could be increased to the point at which each district 
is in effect equally wealthy for purposes of public 
education; or the district tax bases could be altered 
to that same end;45 or both. 
Such systems are called "power equalized."46 At 
present they are hypothetical. Their effect on spending 
is simple. Among districts with similar educational 
tasks spending above some legislated minimum (plus 
categorical aids) would depend solely upon the locally 
chosen education tax rate on real property (or on 
other local sources). To be number one in spending a 
district now would have to try the hardest instead 
of be the richest. Listening intently, one detects in 
power equalizing a medley of the WASP ethic and 
the Marseillaise. 
Valid State Systems Exemplified 
At this point illustrations of a few state systems 
compatible with Serrano may be helpful. The two 
broad groups of models reflect the two major ap-
proaches to legislative remedies based on Serrano: on 
the one hand, full state assumption of costs, and, on 
115 
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the other, "power equalizing." The numbers within 
the models are arbitrary. 
Three Centralized Models: 
[The state provides all funds from centralized tax 
sources. These sources might include income, prop-
erty, value-added, sales, and/or any other taxable 
values or activities.] 
Model# 1-Equal Dollars Per Pupil 
The state provides $750 per child in average daily 
enrollment (ADE). Legislation specifies the extent to 
which the spending units (e.g., districts or schools) 
can decide their own spending priorities. 
Model #2-Equal Dollars Plus Cost Refinements 
The state provides $600 per ADE plus: 
$100 per student whose residence is two miles or 
more distant from school 
$100 per student for districts in areas in which there 
are high costs for goods and services 
$100 per student in areas with high density (to account 
for "municipal overburden"-the presumed but 
difficult to document higher cost levels per capita for 
non-education public services in high-density areas). 
Again, the legislature sets the limits, if ~ny, of _the 
spending unit's discretion in the allocat1on of its 
budget. 
Model # 3-Dollar Preferences for Specific Student 
Types Plus Cost Refinements . 
Each student in the spending unit is assigned a specific 
dollar value: 
$600 per average student 
$1000 per underachieving student 
$2000 per blind student 
$1200 per gifted student + the categorical aids in 
Model #2 for district cost differences. 
Two De-Centralized Models: 
[The state provides a flat grant representing a basic 
adequate minimum level of spending. Districts add 
on by a local tax which is "power equalized," so ~at 
any given rate means the same spendable dollars m 
every similar district.] 
Model # 4-State Flat Grant Plus Local Add-On 
The state supplies $700 per ADE from central sources, 
as in Model # 1. Each district may add on from $25 
to $500 per ADE according to the rule that for each 
additional tax mill ($.001) on $100 taxable value 
of local property, an additional $25 per pupil may be 
spent. If a mill raises less than $25 per pupil (i.e., in 
districts with valuation below $25,000 per pupil) the 
state makes up the difference; if it raises above $25, 
the excess is redistributed as part of the state sub-
vention to poorer districts. Thus, if a rich district and 
a poor each add 16 mills to its rate, each could spend 
a total of $1100 per pupil. 
Model # 5-Flat Grant, Plus Add-Ons, Plus State 
Categorical Aid for Costs and for Specific Student 
Types 
The first two parts of this model are identical to 
Model #4. In addition the state provides specific aids 
for any number of imaginable cost adjustments or 
policy preferences. Examples appear in Models #2 
and #3. lf desired, such adjustments can, through 
other adjustments in the aid formula, be included 
within the power equalized add-on instead of being 
paid in flat grants. For example, underachieving 
children can be counted twice. 
It is also apparent that Serrano would permit de-
centralized family-based or "voucher" plans if they 
were fiscally neutral. The apparatus for such systems 
has been described elsewhere and will not be con-
sidered here. 46n 
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Objections to De-Centralized Systems 
Objection to power equalized models such as # 4 
and # 5 will come from at least three quarters: 
(1) large-unit egalitarians who object to giving groups 
of local voters any control over spending for the 
education of children; (2) technicians who deny the 
possibility of setting up a system which is truly 
wealth-neutral; (3) tax resisters who fear that power 
equalization implies grossly inflated expenditure. 47 
The first group notes that tax~sensitive voters may 
tend to cluster (e.g. older persons with fixed incomes 
and no children). These critics would prefer the 
security of a state mandated uniformity of spending 
which, as they view it, would be more education-
oriented and less arbitrary. The responses to this 
objection of those who prefer local control over state-
mandated uniformity are too many to try to cover here. 
Generally those who prefer local control emphasize 
that statewide uniformity, as well as local control, is 
a compromise among public and private priorities. 
Since there is no choice but to submit children to the 
political process, one might as well leave that process 
close to home where judgments about educational 
needs and efficiency on the one hand and non-educa-
tional priorities on the other can be made in a context 
of particular children and real alternative needs of 
the community. This argument finds its apotheosis 
in family choice or "voucher" systems. Policy conflicts 
between the decentralizers and this first group of 
critics-the large-unit egalitarians-tend to focus 
upon conflicting philosophies of government and edu-
cation, diverse views of the efficacy of money spent 
on schools, and disputes over what is politically 
possible. 
The second group of critics raises a more technical 
objection to local choice. They doubt whether it is 
possible to establish fiscal neutrality or know when 
it exists. Realistically, there are many subtle forms of 
"wealth" difference in addition to differences in the 
value of taxable property per pupil; to equalize 
assessed valuation per pupil does not necessarily 
equalize fiscal capacity. If in a decentralized ("power 
equalized") district system differences in spending 
exist, and if, for example, spending is higher in districts 
with higher personal incomes, how would an objective 
observer determine whether taste, wealth, or some 
other factor is responsible? 
The answers are of several kinds. The first is a 
simple confession and avoidance. Assessed valuation 
may be a defective measure of education financing 
capacity, but a system in which such valuation is 
equalized per pupil at least eliminates the explicit 
gross wealth differences that now exist. Such a change 
is radically superior to no change at all. Another 
answer would stress that the property tax can be 
enormously improved in its administration and is 
likely to be so improved under the spur of litigation. 48 
If rationally and fairly administered, the property tax 
is tolerable and quite clearly constitutional. There is 
apparently no one, however, who doubts its re-
gressivity. A third answer simply suggests that there 
are other and fairer measures of wealth which may 
be employed to measure local tax effort. The most 
obvious, of course, is the income tax. 
The last group of objectors to power equalizing 
asserts that to let poor districts spend like rich districts 
(as in Models #4 and # 5) will drive up the cost of 
education enormously. The answer is that it all 
depends on the particular taxing/spending formula 
the legislature chooses. If in Model #4 the local 
imposition of one additional mill would by statutory 
formula increase spending only $10, perhaps few 
would choose it; at $50 few might refuse it. This 
relation of tax effort to education spending also affects 
the amount of the subvention required; the aid 
formula can reasonably control cost to the degree 
desired by the state. 
The Third Ring: Politics and Long-Run System 
Adjustments 
What kinds of education finance systems will most 
states choose, as Serrano and its progeny begin to 
bring about large-scale change? Despite economic 
and political differences, it is possible to identify 
certain common pressures on the various state legis-
latures: not to reduce spending substantially or all at 
once in rich districts (through cutbacks, layoffs, salary 
reductions); not to increase local property tax; not 
to grossly increase total spending for education; not 
to eliminate local choice; not to cut back on high 
priority categories (such as aid to the poor); not to 
make a radical change in the structure and governance 
of public education. Despite these pressures, under 
a stimulus like Serrano, most states probably can 
increase somewhat the total amount of resources 
allocated to education. In addition, there is an un-
paralleled and probably popular opportunity to 
begin shifting the tax burden for financing education 
in phases from property to income. 
These pressures are neither consistent nor avoid-
able. It is difficult for example, to have wealth 
neutrality in a decentralized model without increasing 
spending on public schools substantially or leveling 
some of the highest spending schools. 
Assuming these conflicting pressures, we may 
expect that above a basic minimum the states will 
adopt relatively conservative compromises between 
cost control on the one hand and local control on the 
other. If forced to predict a typical solution we would 
select Model # 5 above. Its structure permits a fair 
measure of local control, and, if the local tax and 
spending equivalents are carefully selected, can 
operate without bankrupting the state. This last caveat 
is crucial. The first order of business in each state 
should be economic analysis and model building in 
117 
7
et al.: A First Appraisal of Serrano
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1972
118 
order to assure reasonable cost control over educa-
tion. 
All this assumes that most legislatures with de-
liberate speed will cooperate w.ith a judicial decree. 
This seems a realistic prediction; for many reasons 
fiscal neutrality will be less painful to achieve than 
racial desegregation or even reapportionment. In 
addition to the power of voters in poor districts and 
that of the education establishment there will be other 
less obvious but substantial political support for im-
plementing Serrano. A primary factor will be the 
self-interest of the bulk of school districts that cluster 
near the median in wealth. They can expect benefits 
from successful reform; what they can expect from 
unsuccessful reform is trouble. This makes them the 
staunch ally of the court. What such districts do not 
want is a prolonged period of turmoil and doubt in 
which aid formulas, validity of tax impositions, 
validity of bonds,49 and retroactivity remain locked 
in a political struggle. The self-interest of these 
near-median-wealth districts lies in certainty, and they 
will be prepared to accept any reasonable legislative 
package that produces it. 
Another important source of political support for 
the court may be the owners of industrial and com-
mercial property in school districts of low wealth. For 
them the benefit is a reduction in property tax which 
can be translated into higher profit margins or at least 
an improvement of their market position relative to 
competitors now located in tax havens. 50 The com-
bination of businessmen in poor districts and the 
residents of all but the wealthy districts might be a 
potent source of reform pressure, if organized. How-
ever, this alliance, not being traditional, concededly 
will be difficult to put together. Thus far there have 
been no businessmen friends of the court in the school 
finance cases; the self-interest of the businessman 
has not yet become sufficiently visible to him to evoke 
an active response in aiding these cases.~1 
What stance will most upper-middle income and 
upper income families, which can afford private edu-
cation, take? Some say they will desert the public 
schools because the permissible spending levels in a 
post-Serrano system will be too low, and that they 
will then combine deliberately to shrink public educa-
tion spending even further in order to convert their 
present public privilege into private education. These 
cries of alarm overlook present reality. The rich and 
near-rich who live in tax-wealthy districts already 
oppose state equalization, and, if their children attend 
public schools, it is only because these schools are in 
all essential respects private. If these families desert 
public education it is hard to see that much is lost. 
The important upper-income and upper-middle 
income families are those whose children are now in 
public school in districts of low and middling wealth. 
It is hard to believe that these families will desert the 
system they have historically chosen simply because 
it begins to spend more and cost them Jess. Rather, in 
those areas, it is at least as plausible that the improve-
ments made possible by a post-Serrano education 
finance system wi11 draw back into the public 
system those who have sought advantage for their 
children in hitherto better financed private schools. 
What is not likely to develop is bedrock legislative 
or executive intransigence. The blessings of Serrano 
are too obvious and the risks too remote. Indeed, 
among the relevant public officials in California, 
irrespective of party, it is difficult to discover a critic 
of the Serrano result. The more common reaction is 
that this is what was always hoped for and the only 
surprise is that it took so long in coming. Two of the 
more prominent defendants have publicly declared 
their opposition to the state attorney general's seeking 
review by the U.S. Supreme Court. All this is not to 
say that the California legislature will promptly adopt 
a new and valid structure, though that is possible. It 
wi11 not be easy for the legislator to bite the bullet so 
long as he retains the notion that the court might 
do it for him by mandating a specific remedy. For-
tunately Serrano offers little hope of such direct 
judicial intervention in the reform process. 52 
Serrano and Other Public Services 
Ultimately the idea of Serrano and Van Dusartz 
is intensely conservative, setting ethical limits upon 
the terms by which the state may dispose the fate of 
men. The Serrano principle is a fragment of the 
larger norm that, whatever other role government 
may play in society, it should never deliberately create 
privilege or burden without justification. This is 
perhaps a truism; regrettably it is also largely myth. 
One need only scan the spectrum of governmental 
activity within this country to discover its antithesis. 
Local government has not operated in this way since 
the 19th century, if ever. Some justify the result as 
variety, and no doubt variety can have its charms. 
To the poor district, however, the pattern is not the 
pied beauty of Joseph's coat but the ugliness of fiscal 
anarchy-an anarchy decreed by the state itself. The 
world of sub-governments-police, sewers, mosquito 
abatement-is a welter of privilege and impotence 
among governmental units responsible for the same 
function; the pattern is built and sustained by de-
pendence of each unit upon collections of local 
property tax. 
Serrano would withhold from the state this ability 
to create privilege and burden only as to education. 
However, the effect upon other governmental services 
cannot help but be substantial. This would be true 
even under a system of full state assumption of the 
cost of education; the burdens of providing police, 
parks, and libraries through the local property tax 
are complementary and would generally be eased in 
communities of low taxable property wealth. 53 
Whether and how much the burden for those services 
would be increased in non-poor communities would 
be affected by both the level of school spending fixed 
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by the state and by the state's choice of tax sources 
to support that level. It is hard to believe that spending 
for local non-educational functions would not be 
influenced. 
Adoption of a power equalized school district 
system would have analogous but more complex 
effects on other public services. For example, assuming 
the same relative preferences for schools and parks 
that existed prior to adoption of such a system-and 
depending on the shape of the new school formula-
a community's relative investment in the two func-
tions could obviously be shifted. Power equalizing 
would alter the price of education for nearly all dis-
tricts, and the interdependencies of local services 
would assert themselves in contrasting ways. That is, 
this all would happen unless the state either mandated 
or assumed the cost of other services beside education. 
In fact there are certain to be pressures toward such 
comprehensive fiscal neutrality. The Serrano idea 
will increase sensitivity to abuses in respect to other 
public services, which have been long endured because 
of their apparent inevitability; this dissatisfaction will 
be further stimulated by economists and politicians, 
some of whom will promote full state assumption of 
all services, and others of whom will argue for power-
equalizing these same functions. The Constitution is 
unlikely ever to impose a comprehensive rule upon 
the state, but, given diffusion of the Serrano message, 
the eventual achievement of full neutrality through 
the political process is not unthinkable. 
Assuming such a development with respect to all 
services, what would be the outlook for survival of 
local control over government budgets? The answers 
tend to be polarized. On the one hand the desire for 
simple solutions may drive the system relentlessly 
toward homogeneity of spending through full state 
assumption. On the other hand the enduring human 
instinct for the familiar local community may find in 
Serrano a key to building true local control based 
upon an equality of unit power. States will no doubt 
follow various paths, including the paths of selec-
tivity and compromise. It would, for example, be 
plausible for a state to power-equalize education 
(allowing significant local add-ons) while centralizing 
the funding of every other service. Of all public 
functions, education in its goals and methods is least 
understood and most in need of local varjety, experi-
mentation, and independence. 
There is plainly no answer to whether Serrano and 
its progeny will in behavioral terms produce an overall 
drift toward centralization. Indeed, in terms of true 
local autonomy it may as likely produce a renaissance 
of community control. 54 The principal argument 
against this outcome is that he who pays calls the 
tune. As we have seen, however, there is nothing in 
power-equalized systems requiring increased state 
subventions. Given a legislative commitment to re-
design the basic system, it can be the local unit which 
bears the bulk of the cost, if that is desired. 55 No one 
can predict with confidence who will have the votes 
on that issue. 
The Federal Role 
Serrano's influence upon the federal role in educa-
tion finance deserves at least brief consideration.56 
Ultimately Serrano should broaden federal involve-
ment, and should bring some commitment to redress-
ing interstate imbalance.57 The emergence of visibly 
fair state financing systems can only heighten the 
incongruity of the present problem of interstate 
inequality. The policy analogies to the state/district 
relationship are close, and the legislative solutions 
are similar. Federal preemption of school spending 
or federal power equalizing of the states are pos-
sibilities in theory. In the latter solution states making 
the same proportional effort against their differing 
total wealths would be permitted to spend at the same 
level. Internally they would be free to adopt either 
monolithic or decentralized finance models. The 
imaginable ultimate would be exclusively federal 
funding of education through grants made directly to 
families and individuals, achieving simultaneously 
the quintessence of centralization and its opposite. 58 
CONCLUSION 
In all this, we have assumed that Serrano will 
survive as constitutional law. It does not follow that 
judicial quietus would terminate its influence. The 
California court has revealed the emperor's naked-
ness; it becomes more difficult to overlook his patent 
ugliness. Perhaps the old order will remain tolerable, 
but it is risky to underestimate the educational effect 
of such a decision. 
With or without the imprimatur of the United States 
Supreme Court, in a decade or two the influence of 
Serrano will merge readily into the flood of economic 
and social change. Discomfort to the political system 
will be minimized by Serrano's essential harmony 
with dominant values and mythology-with mythol-
ogy because most of us imagine present reality to be 
roughly as Serrano requires it;59 with values because 
most of us still object to the deliberate bestowal of 
unmerited privilege by government. 
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1. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P. 2d 1241 (1971). 
2. For purposes of the decision the court accepted assessed 
property valuation per pupil as the measure of district 
wealth. 5 Cal. 3d at 599. This is the measure implied in the 
proposed California enabling legislation and was the measure 
suggested by the complaint. Obviously assessed valuation of 
property may be an imprecise index of wealth in economists' 
terms. See note 48, infra. Further, there are presumably 
many influences upon spending other than wealth. 
3. The rule is not in haec verba. The Court in Serrano 
stated that the infirmity of the California system was that 
"it makes the quality of a child's education a function of 
the wealth of his parents and neighbors." 5 Cal. 3d at 587. 
The Court in Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, No. 3-71 Civ. 243 
(U.S.D.C.D.Minn., decided Oct. 12, 1971), 40 U.S.L.W. 2228 
(Oct. 26, 1971), refined this formulation: "the level of 
spending for a child's education may not be a function of 
wealth other than the wealth of the state as a whole." 
4. Ibid. 
5. 40 Law Week 2398 (Jan. 4, 1972). The Lawyers' Com-
mittee for Civil Rights Under Law in Washington, D.C. is 
now serving as a clearinghouse for Serrano-type litigation. 
6. 28 U.S.C. ~ 1257. See generally Stern and Gressman, 
Supreme Court Practice (4th ed.), at 93-110 (1969). 
7. In its decision on the petition for rehearing (Oct. 25, 
1971). 
8. " ... [T]he designation given the judgment by state 
practice is not controlling." Richfield Oil Corp. v. State 
Board, 329 U.S. 69, 72 (1946). 
9. It is, however, also possible that the trial will involve 
the issue of the alleged relation between spending and 
quality of education. 5 Cal. 3d at 599 (FN. 14), 601 (FN. 16). 
See text accompanying notes 28-30, infra. 
10. This is an implied limitation of the Court's jurisdiction. 
" ... If the same judgment would be rendered by the state 
court after we corrected its views of federal laws, our review 
could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion." 
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-6 (1945). See generally 
Stern and Gressman, supra note 6, at 131-142; Wright, 
Federal Courts 487-92 (1970). 
11. 5 Cal. 3d at 596 (FN; 11). 
12. See Dixon v. Duffy, 342 U.S. 33 (1951), 343 U.S. 393 
(1952), 344 U.S. 143 (1952); Dep't of Mental Hygiene v. 
Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194 (1965), 62 Cal. 2d 586, 400 P. 2d 
321 (1965). 
13. Cramp v. Bd of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961). 
14. Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365 (1968). Of 
course the California Court would still remain free to depart 
from the federal result on state grounds in a subsequent 
proceeding. 
15. See Wright, supra note 10, at 196-208. In Askew v. 
Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971), the District Court had held 
that Florida's ceiling on local educational tax rates violated 
the equal protection clause because the limit discriminated 
against poor districts. The Supreme Court remanded because 
the trial court should have abstained while proceedings in 
the state courts, already initiated, determined the validity 
of the limit under the Florida Constitution. 
16. The most prominent candidates are two Texas cases, 
Guerra v. Smith, No. 71-2857 (U.S.C.A. 5th Cir.), on appeal 
from the Western District of Texas (order below granting 
motion to dismiss dated July 20, 1971), and Rodriguez v. 
San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist., supra note 5. 
17. Decided Aug. 13, 1971, 40 U.S.L.W. 2127 (Sept. 21, 
1971). 
18. See text accompanying notes 36-37, infra. 
19. A decision reversing the refusal of the court below to 
order the convening of a three judge panel seems.the nearest 
thing to a victory that is likely to emerge at this point. 
20. For details of the following analysis see the opinion in 
Serrano, 5 Cal. 3d at 591-5. 
21. Of course, the flat grant is not earmarked for rich dis-
tricts, but is subtracted from the amount of aid going to 
districts receiving foundation aid. Thus, the grant is "ghost 
money" to poorer districts and may as well be earmarked 
for richer ones. See Serrano, 5 Cal. 3d at 595. Politically, in 
almost every state, such aid is a concession to richer districts. 
22. On motions on the pleadings, Serrano plaintiffs' allega-
tions of this pattern must be taken as true. However, the 
court goes further, finding the pattern itself by a combination 
of judicial notice, structural analysis, and illustrative ex-
amples. It is questionable whether any facts not subject to 
judicial notice are required. From official records, a per-
suasive series of graphs, tables and synthetic arguments is 
readily constructed. See Amici Brief for Urban Coalition and 
National Committee for Support of Public Schools, at 4-21. 
23. For a general consideration of the doctrines, see 
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Foreword: On 
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
83 Harv. L.R. 7 (1969). 
24. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969). 
25. 5 Cal. 3d at 601. 
26. lri. at 611. See Van Dusartz, supra note 3. 
27. See Wise, The California Doctrine, Saturday Review, 
p. 78 (Nov. 20, 1971). 
28. See the sources cited in Serrano, 5 Cal. 3d at 601 
(FN. 16). 
29. Id. 
30. Supra note 3. 
3 I. See text p. 117 , infra. 
32. It does seem likely that Serrano will extend to those 
educational services in which the relation of wealth to 
spending is most obvious. Junior colleges are the most 
inviting target at least when they depend upon local property 
t<tx. The rest of higher education seems protected by the 
obscurity of the economic relations. 
33. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
34. 402 U.S. 137 (1970). 
35. 5 Cal. 3d at 604-10. The Valtierra opinion, stark as it 
is, may be helpful to the Serrano principle in an unexpected 
way. As Van Dusartz puts it: 
Valtierra actually supports the "fundamentality" of the 
interest in education. The Court there emphasized the special 
importance of the democratic process exemplified in local 
plebiscites. That perspective here assists pupil plaintiffs who 
ask no more than equal capacity for local voters to raise 
school money in tax referenda, thus making the democratic 
process all the more effective. See supra note 3. 
36. 5 Cal. 3d at 589. 
37. Likewise the racial district wealth pattern may be other 
than intuition might suggest. In California over half the 
minority pupils reside in districts above the average in assessed 
valuation per pupil. Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, Private 
Wealth and Public Education 357 (1970). 
38. There is no easy definition of the class. The Serrano 
complaint defines it as all pupils in all districts other than 
the wealthiest. Since this literally would include such districts 
as Beverly Hills among the injured class, there are evident 
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incongruities. However, there is no other completely logical 
line to draw. 
39. 5 Cal. 3d at 603. 
40. However, this involves the difficulty that there is no 
discrimination against the poor (children) but only within 
the class of poor. 
41. F.Supp. (1971). 
42. Id. 
43. There seems no doubt that Serrano applies to capital 
costs; such expenditures have a relation to quality of educa-
tion which prima facie is equal to that of current ex-
penditures. Since many states have left the districts almost 
completely on their own to finance construction, the 
Serrano violation is a fortiori. 
44. The Serrano court's brief discussion of "territorial uni-
formity" will doubtless cause confusion. The Court concludes 
that "if a voter's address may not determine the weight to 
which his ballot is entitled, surely it should not determine 
the quality of his child's education," 5 Cal. 3d at 613. Some 
educators have taken this to imply that mandated statewide 
uniformity of spending may be required. See Wise, supra 
note 27. So construed, however, this brief utterance would 
render superfluous that four-fifths of the opinion devoted 
exclusively to establishing the less restrictive principle of 
fiscal neutrality. It would also accord the plaintiffs relief 
which they specifically disavowed in the briefs and argu-
ments before the California Supreme Court. It should be 
added that during oral argument in Serrano several of the 
California justices voting with the majority indicated their 
strong objection to mandated uniformity. No doubt what the 
court intended was that a voter's residence should not affect 
the taxable resources available for his child's education. 
The Van Dusartz opinion so interprets Serrano. 
See supra note 3. 
45. Gradual equalization of tax bases could altogether 
solve any problems of excessive cost to the state. This is not 
hard to accomplish in theory. First, if industrial and com-
mercial property were removed from the local base and 
taxed at a uniform rate statewide, wealth disparities among 
districts would shrink enormously. In California the spectrum 
of district wealth would probably collapse to about 1I40th of 
its present range. If the wealthiest residential areas were 
then redistricted with the aim of a rough tax-base equaliza-
tion, the substance of the problem could be removed. 
Ironically what would emerge is a fair system of school 
finance in which the state's role was effectively reduced to 
that of the provider of categorical aids for special costs and 
needs. With slight exaggeration such a system might be 
styled "full local funding." 
46. The expression is from Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, 
Private Wealth and Public Education, supra note 37, at 202. 
46a. See J. Coons and S. Sugarman, Family Choice in 
Education (1971). 
47. There are, of course, other kinds of objections. For 
example, some boosters of educational spending fear that 
power equalizing would actually reduce spending because 
local voters (if they get the choice) will visit their tax frustra-
tions upon the schools. Others argue that in large districts 
(e.g., Los Angeles) there is no reality to "local" choice 
without decreasing the size of the effective school governance 
unit; however, such fragmentation may in turn complicate 
racial integration efforts. 
48. A number of empirical attempts to measure local 
resources effectively have been attempted or are ongoing. 
See National Educational Finance Project, Alternative 
Programs for Financing Education 59-102 (1971). For a 
recent judicial reaction to discriminatory assessment prac-
tices see Lee v. Boswell, 40 Law Week 2060 (July 27, 1971). 
49. See Wall Street Journal, p. 16 (Dec. l, 1971). 
50. One long term effect of Serrano could be to reduce 
the powerful incentive for industry to cluster in tax havens. 
Removal of this artificial market incentive might help 
stimulate new approaches to the problem of locating industry 
for the general convenience of mankind. 
51. The primary opposition to reform will be residents 
(rich and poor) of wealthy districts and the industrial and 
commercial interests located therein. However, even legis-
lators who have among the districts they represent some 
very rich ones may find it difficult to be truly obstructive, 
since they ordinarily represent eight or ten districts, a 
majority of which are likely to be of middle or low wealth. 
52. In the very unlikely event of outright legislative de-
fiance, the courts are in a much stronger position to have 
their way with fiscal neutrality than either desegregation 
or reapportionment. In addition to the obvious political 
risks run by obstructionists, the court's possible ability to 
close off tax support for unconstitutional systems could bring 
the legislature to heel. In this respect it is interesting that 
Serrano specifically recognized the taxpayer's right to enjoin 
the operation of an unconstitutional system. 5 Cal. 3d at 618. 
53. This is true except where low district property value 
coincides with high personal income under a new structure 
in which the taxes employed by the state to fund the system 
are highly progressive. Thus a tax-poor middle class suburb 
with no industry would trade a substantial property tax rate 
for a substantial income tax rate. 
54. Serrano will provide the long sought impetus to 
eliminate very small districts. At the same time it closes out 
the long movement for district consolidation by subsuming 
its rationale. If tax bases in a decentralized system must be 
effectively equivalent through power equalizing, there is no 
point in amalgamating districts beyond the point of 
increasing educational efficiency. Currently district gigantism 
is receiving low grades in this respect. H. Levin (ed.), 
Community Control of Schools 251-256 (1970). Coinci-
dentally ethnic movements for fragmentation of school 
authority are growing. If fragmentation no longer means 
diminution of fiscal capacity, the community control move-
ment has become economically credible. It is now difficult 
to justify the independence of a middle class suburb while 
rejecting community demands in the inner city. The relation 
of this seeming benefit to the problem of racial segregation 
is unclear, but prima facie it will make metropolitan integra-
tion plans more difficult. 
55. See supra note 45. 
56. A constitutional handle upon the federal government 
analogous to Serrano is credible in theory, but presently 
pointless in fact. The Fifth Amendment may do equal 
protection service, but there are no federal programs visibly 
dispensing money according to wealth. The Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act, 20 U.S.C. ,,~ 24la, 241c (Supp. 
1968), could be a stunning exception, but its wealth categories 
are presumably intended only as surrogates for true edu-
cational need. As such they are probably viable. The more 
obvious example of effect on a federal program involves the 
so-called "impacted areas" legislation. 20 U.S.C. ~ 241 
(1969). If states may not use districts of unequal capacity, 
this aid loses the supporting rationale of replacing taxable 
local wealth lost through federal enclaves. Presumably such 
aid would be given now where the impact was felt-at the 
state level-and only if the state were relying on property tax. 
57. The nature of federal participation takes on increased 
significance from recent suggestions that a national value-
added tax be levied to raise more than ten billion dollars 
annually for the support of public elementary and secondary 
education. 
58. Of course, any voucher system would require protections 
against reintroduction of the influence of wealth differences. 
See J. Coons and S. Sugarman, supra note 46a. 
59. We are personally acquainted with residents of wealthy 
districts who express personal grievance at the local property 
tax! With equal reason might General Motors complain of 
the necessity for building automobiles. 
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